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A Case for and Against the Borough President
I.	INTRODUCTION

Since the time when Manhattan, Brooklyn, Staten Island, Queens, and the
Bronx became the five boroughs of Greater New York City,1 the city’s leaders have
struggled to find a method of government that allows the individual boroughs to
quickly and effectively address their difficulties while at the same time maintaining
centralized government bodies capable of remedying citywide issues. To this end, the
position of Borough President was created to advocate and wield political power on
behalf of each respective borough. Yet, in the twenty-first century the position of
Borough President is at a crossroads. While at one point in New York City’s history
the Borough President was an important position in city politics, many commentators
who closely study city government now feel that the position was rendered irrelevant
by the drastic overhaul of city government that occurred in November 1989. 2
Shortly after the position was created in 1898, the five Borough Presidents were
each given votes on the Board of Estimate, the foremost governing body in New
York City. After elements of the Board of Estimate’s electoral scheme were declared
unconstitutional in 1989, 3 the Borough Presidents lost the greatest part of their
influence in shaping citywide policy, though they retained control over some intraborough affairs. Eventually, the loss of political clout spurred calls to terminate the
position.
Currently the five Borough Presidents4 wield power under chapter 4 of the City
Charter.5 Each Borough President serves a four-year term, with a maximum term
limit of twelve years.6 Most of this power relates to zoning, land use, and stewardship
of an annual budget. Borough Presidents retain their influence over intra-borough
affairs by appointing members of the Community Boards in their respective
boroughs.7 The Borough Presidents also work with the Mayor, as an advocate on
behalf of their borough, during the city’s budget-making process.
1.

See infra p. 196.

2.

See Alan Finder, The 1989 Elections Charter; Overhaul of New York City Charter Is Approved, Polls Show,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1989, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/08/nyregion/1989elections-charter-overhaul-new-york-city-charter-approved-polls-show.html; see also John Horenstein
& Stanley Trybulski, New York City’s Charter Revision: The Political Aftermath, 1 J. L. & Pol’y 113, 115
(1993); Jonathan Holub & Irina Gonikberg-Dolinskiy, The Borough President: Community Leader or
Excess Political Baggage, 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 1197, 1201– 02 (1998).

3.

See Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 691 (1989).

4.

As this publication was going to press, the Borough Presidents in 2013 were: Ruben Diaz, Jr. of the
Bronx, Marty Markowitz of Brooklyn, Scott Stringer of Manhattan, Helen M. Marshall of Queens,
and James P. Molinaro of Staten Island.

5.

See N.Y.C. Charter § 82 (2013).

6.

Id. at § 81(b).

7.		
The Borough President appoints the members of community boards for two-year

terms, reviews and makes recommendations on ULURP applications, maintains
planning and budget offices, administers training to community board members and
serves as chairperson of the Borough Board and Borough Service Cabinet. Community
boards are local representative bodies. There are 59 community boards throughout the

194

N

VOLUME 58 | 2013/14

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

This article will examine the evolution of the powers of the Borough Presidents
and trace the waxing and waning of those powers through amendments to the City
Charter. Part II will recount the creation of the city’s five-borough system and how
the office of Borough President came to be. Part III will examine the effects the
1989 Charter Revision had on the power of the Borough Presidents. Finally, Part IV
will look at the powers wielded by Borough Presidents in the twenty-first century
and examine the continued viability of the position and the reasons for and against
its retention.
II.	THE FIVE BOROUGHS AND THE CREATION OF THE BOROUGH PRESIDENCY

A. From Settlement to Super City

The residents and leaders of New York City have for many years created political
offices in an effort to prevent other city offices from acquiring too much authority. The
process of creating political positions that supplement the city’s chief executive is nearly
as old as the city itself.8 As early as the seventeenth century, the city’s political leaders
have sought to distribute power among multiple bodies and offices. In 1653, Peter
Stuyvesant, as Director-Governor of the colony, was pressured by Dutch colonists to
grant New Amsterdam a Charter establishing a town governed by two Burgomasters,
five Aldermen, and a Sheriff.9 After the English displaced the Dutch,10 successive
Charters throughout the eighteenth century sought to bestow certain regulatory powers
on the offices of Mayor and Alderman.11 As the colonies became the United States and
the population of New York City grew,12 so did the demand that New York City’s
municipal government reach a broad cross-section of citizens living not only in
Manhattan, but also in Brooklyn and the areas that are now Queens and the Bronx.13
City, and each one consists of up to 50 unsalaried members, half of whom are nominated
by their district’s City Council members. Board members are selected and appointed by
the Borough Presidents from among active, involved people of each community and
must reside, work, or have some other significant interest in the community.

About Community Boards, N.Y.C. Mayor’s Cmty. Affairs Unit, http://www.nyc.gov/html/cau/html/
cb/about.shtml#govt (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
8.

Originally inhabited by the Lenape tribe, the island of Manhattan was purchased in 1626 from its
original indigenous inhabitants by Dutch settlers for what historical accounts recorded as “the price of
sixty florins.” Francois Weil, A History of New York 7 (2000).

9.

Id.

10.

The English Crown took possession of the colony of New Amsterdam from the Dutch on September 8,
1664. King Charles II decided to end the trade and colonization war in North America and decreed that
his brother, James, Duke of York, was to take title to all lands located between Virginia and New
England. The seizure of New Amsterdam occurred without bloodshed as the Dutch colonists, concerned
about their economic interests, pressured Stuyvesant into surrender. Id. at 14.

11.

Id. at 36. Many successive Charters bore the names of City Governors responsible for their enactment:
Dongan in 1686, Cornbury in 1708, and Montgomerie in 1731.

12.

By 1880, the city’s population first eclipsed one million residents. See Wallace S. Sayre & Herbert
Kaufman, Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis 20 (1965).

13.

Id. at 18.
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The office of Borough President as we know it today was the product of the slow
process of the consolidation of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the outlying areas into
Greater New York City.14 Political aspirations calling for an “imperial city” in New
York Harbor led New York City politicians to consider annexing townships on the
mainland of New York, as well as parts of Long Island.15 The consolidation process
took place during the later decades of the nineteenth century.16 For generations prior
to that, New York City, the municipal name for the island of Manhattan, and
Brooklyn were entirely separate cities, each with its own Mayor and Aldermen.17
Over time, New York City expanded northwards by adding areas of the Bronx in
1877 and 1895.18 New York City, in its modern form, was born on the evening of
December 31, 1897.19 On that night, as 1898 was ushered in, the bells of City Hall
announced a unification of Manhattan and Brooklyn, into Greater New York City.20
The five boroughs comprising the city were Manhattan, Brooklyn, the Bronx,
Queens, and Staten Island, with each borough also existing as a separate county
within New York State.21 The creation of the five boroughs therefore necessitated the
creation of the office of Borough President.22 The Borough Presidency became an
official position with the new City Charter revisions that accompanied the great
consolidation and formation of the boroughs in 1898.
B. A Seat at the Head Table: Borough President Power After 1901

The first modern version of the Charter for New York City, written in 1898, set
forth the powers and duties of the municipality’s government 23 and allocated
14.

Id. at 11–15. Queens became a borough through the combination of Long Island City and Queens
County. The Bronx was created out of a combination of parts of New York City with areas of Yonkers
and lower Westchester County. See Holub & Gonikberg-Dolinskiy, supra note 2, at 1198.

15.

Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 12.

16.

Id. at 11–15.

17.

The consolidation process unified New York City, the nation’s largest city, with Brooklyn, which, at the
time of its incorporation into New York City, was the fourth-largest city in the United States, with a
population of over 800,000. By 1900, two years after this consolidation, the unified New York City had
nearly double the population of Chicago, the nation’s second-largest city. See id. at 11.

18.

David C. Hammack, Reflections on the Creation of the Greater City of New York and Its First Charter, 42
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 693, 695–96 (1998).

19.

Weil, supra note 8, at 166.

20. Id. at 167. The celebration was confined solely to the streets of Manhattan as many residents in Brooklyn

lamented the “disappearance of Brooklyn”; the aura in Brooklyn was filled with a “funereal melancholy”
as it lost its autonomy. The boroughs of Staten Island and Queens were also added through the
consolidation of 1898, and the two large areas of the Bronx, added in 1874 and 1895, were combined
into a single borough. See Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 14.

21.

Horenstein & Trybulski, supra note 2, at 115. Brooklyn is Kings County and Staten Island is Richmond
County.

22.

Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 14.

23.

Id. at 14–16.
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responsibilities to the Mayor, along with the City Council, 24 and the Borough
Presidents. 25 The government was strongly centralized, with power allocated to a
single Mayor as executive and the Board of Aldermen as the legislative body.26 The
powers of the newly created Borough Presidency—along with most of the government
offices—were not fully articulated in the 1898 Charter. The creation of the Borough
Presidency was an important way to assuage fears that the Charter overhaul would
completely centralize city government in the hands of City Hall.27
The purpose of creating the Borough Presidency was in part to avoid the system of
ward politics that was plaguing cities such as Chicago and Philadelphia.28 In a ward
system, elected officials are strongly beholden to the constituents of a neighborhood or
electoral district within the larger city. These wards are typically small and often lack
diversity.29 In contrast, boroughs are large, ethnically diverse, and densely populated
political territories. The hope was that the elected Borough Presidents would be visible
and accountable to a large, diverse constituency30 and that the increased visibility of the
position would, ideally, cultivate responsibility to the borough’s population.31
Unfortunately, the 1898 Charter, considered a “hastily assembled document,”
failed to adequately define the powers of the various city offices, including Borough
President. As a result, the city’s government structure underwent another overhaul
three years later in 1901. 32 The 1901 revisions redefined the allocation of
responsibilities under the 1898 Charter.33 The political entity created under the 1901
Charter that gave the Borough Presidents a greater say in crafting citywide policy
was the Board of Estimate.34 At its inception, the members of the Board were the
Mayor, the President of the Board of Aldermen, 35 the Comptroller, and the five
Borough Presidents. 36 The Board became “the city government’s most powerful
24.

Starting with the 1898 Charter, the modern political body of the City Council evolved out of the Board
of Aldermen.

25.

Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 14.

26. Id.
27.

See Holub & Gonikberg-Dolinskiy, supra note 2, at 1198.

28. Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 17.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31.

Id.

32.

Id. at 14.

33.

Although the 1898 Charter successfully consolidated the five boroughs into Greater New York City,
numerous boards and commissions had the potential to reduce the Mayor’s broad formal powers. The
powers of the legislative body were also clouded by uncertainty. Further Charter revisions had to wait
until after the city conducted its first elections. Id. at 15.

34. Id.
35.

The Board of Aldermen was renamed the “City Council” in 1937. Id. at 634.

36. Id.
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single institution.”37 It was empowered to grant leases of city property, make policy
recommendations to the Mayor or City Council, hold public hearings, and exercise
final authority on the development and improvement of city land.38 In addition to
control over dispensation of city property, the Board had a mix of executive and
legislative functions. Its legislative abilities included the power to review City Council
legislation, and its executive powers were concentrated in a large budget allocation
and in control over pensions paid out of the city’s coffers. 39
The members of the Board were not elected to their seats; instead, they were on
the Board by virtue of holding their offices.40 Each Borough President was elected
only by the voters residing in the individual boroughs and was given one vote on the
Board.41 For over eighty years, the necessity and power of the Borough Presidents
were integrally tied to their seats on the Board of Estimate.
III. DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE 1989 CHARTER REVISIONS

A. The Demise of the Board of Estimate

For nearly the entire twentieth century, New York City politics functioned as a
triadic system comprised of the Mayor, the City Council, and the Board of Estimate.42
The powers of these political entities were therefore directly affected by litigation
concerning the constitutionality of the voting structure of the Board of Estimate.43
On March 23, 1989,44 this “queen” on the chessboard of New York City politics was
taken out of the picture, creating a power vacuum,45 when the U.S. Supreme Court in
Board of Estimate v. Morris held that the Board of Estimate’s voting structure was an

37.

Id.

38. Id. at 654. See N.Y.C Charter chs. 61–68 (1989).
39.

Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 630.

40. Id. at 654.
41.

Id. at 653–54.

42.

Horenstein & Trybulski, supra note 2, at 115; see also Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12.

43.

See Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane, The Policy and Politics of Charter Making: The Story of New
York City’s 1989 Charter, 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 723, 741 (1998) (“It is important to note what the
Supreme Court did not decide. First, the Court did not hold that the Board as an institution was
unconstitutional, but rather that its voting structure was unconstitutional. This led to one of the central
early debates of the Charter revision process: Could the Board legally—and should it substantively—be
‘saved’ by a scheme of ‘weighted voting’ that would, for example, give six votes to Brooklyn’s borough
president as opposed to one vote to Staten Island’s? Second, the Court’s decision was based only on the
‘one person-one vote’ principle.”).

44. “Because the boroughs have widely disparate populations—yet each has equal representation on the

board—the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that this structure is inconsistent with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We affirm.” Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489
U.S. 688, 691 (1989).

45.

“On the chessboard of the city’s politics, the Mayor may be king, but the Board of Estimate is queen.”
Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 652.
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unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.46 As a result, New York
City was faced with a dramatic policy choice: restructure the Board of Estimate to
conform to constitutional principles or execute a fundamental reconstruction of New
York City government. Mayor Edward I. Koch established a Charter Revision
Commission, chaired by Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., to propose changes to the City
Charter for approval by the electorate.47 Mayor Koch opted for the second of the two
choices in response to Morris. Koch and others recognized that the crisis was an
opportunity for a massive overhaul of the city’s government structure.48
The reformation of New York City government into its present-day form occurred
through the 1989 Charter revisions.49 The Commission decided against proposing
population-based weighted voting for a revamped Board of Estimate.50 Instead, the
revisions of 1989 would remove the Board of Estimate from New York City
government entirely.51 The Commission decided to abolish the Board altogether in
favor of a centralized city government with a strong Mayor and City Council.52
The Borough Presidents at the time were unhappy with the developments and
proposals being considered by the Schwarz Commission.53 Of the five sitting
Borough Presidents, three were staunchly opposed to the Charter revision proposals,
including the abolition of the Board of Estimate. Staten Island Borough President
Ralph J. Lamberti publicly denounced the proposals, warning constituents of an
46. Morris, 489 U.S. 688. The crux of the plaintiffs’ argument in Morris was that allocating one vote to each

of the five Borough Presidents to decide matters over which the Board had jurisdiction unconstitutionally
diluted the voting rights of Brooklyn residents under the Fourteenth Amendment doctrine of “one
person one vote.” At the time of the litigation, Brooklyn had a population of 2.2 million people and
Staten Island had a population of about 350,000. “In between were Queens with 1.9 million, Manhattan
with 1.4 million, and the Bronx with 1.1 million.” In terms of representation, “each Staten Island
resident, as a result, had six times more representative power than a Brooklyn resident,” which violated
the one-person-one-vote requirement. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 43, at 740.

47.

Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. was at the time of his appointment a former New York City Corporation
Counsel. Eric Lane served as the Commission’s Executive Director. Mayor Koch appointed Schwarz
and the fourteen other members of the Commission on January 18, 1989, utilizing his power under
section 36 of the Municipal Home Rule Law. N.Y. Mun Home Rule Law § 36 (McKinney 2012); see
also Schwarz & Lane, supra note 43, at 729, 741.

48. Schwarz & Lane, supra note 43, at 742 (“Without Morris, attempts to make major changes in the City’s

governance would have been thwarted, regardless of significant objections to the Board’s governmental
functions and representational deficiencies. With Morris, broad change became possible, not only
because of what it held but because it galvanized attention to questions of governance.”).

49. Id. at 729, 756.
50. With the abandonment of the weighted voting proposals, all hopes for retaining the Board were lost. See

id. at 765

51.

Id.

52.

See Finder, supra note 2 (“The proposal from the Charter Revision Commission calls for eliminating the
Board of Estimate, which has been at the heart of city affairs for almost 100 years. It would redistribute
the board’s powers over land use, franchises, contracts and the budget, primarily to the City Council
and the mayor. Government People ‘Can Understand.’”).

53.

Id.
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impending “imperial mayoralty.”54 Brooklyn Borough President Howard Golden,
despite the federal court’s declaration that the Board of Estimate unconstitutionally
violated the voting rights of Brooklynites, said the Board was necessary for the city
to run effectively.55 Concerned about the centralization of power in the hands of the
Mayor, Golden later proposed that New York State create a commission on borough
governance.56 Additionally, Golden wanted land use decisions and budget allocations
to begin each year at the borough level, not in the Mayor’s office.57 Golden received
vocal support from Queens Borough President Claire Shulman and Lamberti’s
challenger for Staten Island Borough President, Guy V. Molinari, but he was
unsuccessful in slowing momentum generated in support of the Schwarz
Commission’s proposals.58 Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer was also
disappointed that the Schwarz Commission proposed abandoning the Board; Ferrer
wanted a revamped Board that complied with federal election standards because he
felt that weighting voting power by population would be a boon for the Bronx.59
Borough President Shulman campaigned feverishly in opposition to the Charter
revisions, lamenting its adverse effect on her position before succumbing to stronger
opposition in favor of the revisions.60 The only Borough President in favor of the
Schwarz Commission’s proposals was David N. Dinkins of Manhattan.61 Although
Dinkins initially said he would “reluctantly and conditionally” support the Charter
revision proposals, months later he changed his tune, saying he could not “conceive
of a circumstance wherein [he] would oppose the charter.”62

54. Id. Borough President Lamberti was defeated in the 1989 election by his Republican challenger Guy V.

Molinari, who took office January 1, 1990. Molinari did, however, echo his predecessor’s sentiments
concerning the revisions’ negative effect on the outer boroughs.

55.

Id.

56. Horenstein & Trybulski, supra note 2, at 140–41.
57.

Id. at 140.

58. Id. at 141. The centralization of power in the Mayor’s office and the siphoning of power away from the

boroughs themselves was the impetus for talks of secession in Staten Island. In 1993, Staten Island
residents, by a margin of nearly two to one, voted in favor of secession before final approval of the
measure died in the New York State Assembly. See also James Dao, The 1993 Elections: Staten Island;
Secession Is Approved; Next Move Is Albany’s, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1993, at B4, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/1993/11/03/nyregion/the-1993-elections-staten-island-secession-is-approved-next-moveis-albany-s.html; Kate Kelberg, In New York, The Secession Obsession Still Lingers, City & State (Aug.
10, 2009), http://www.cityandstateny.com/in-new-york-the-secession-obsession-still-lingers/; Staten
Island Brief History, The Staten Island Historian, http://www.statenislandhistorian.com/Staten_
Island_History.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).

59.

Finder, supra note 2.

60. Id.
61.

Id.

62. Id.
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Despite the vocal opposition, the Board of Estimate was dissolved with the 1989
Charter revisions, which were ratified by the city electorate on November 7, 1989.63
As the Borough Presidents no longer had the platform of the Board of Estimate to
allow them to shape citywide policy, the position diminished in significance. Only a
few years after the 1989 revisions, the long-term viability of the position came under
intense scrutiny.64
IV.	THE BOROUGH PRESIDENCY IN THE Twenty-First CENTURY

A. The Powers of the Modern Borough President

The codified source of the Borough Presidents’ powers, after the 1989 Charter
revisions, is chapter 4 of the City Charter.65 More specifically, section 82 of the
Charter covers the duties and responsibilities of the office. 66 Although paling in
comparison to the power and influence of the Mayor or City Council,67 the position
provides the citizens of each borough with an advocate capable of introducing
legislation, lobbying, and coordinating political capital on their behalf.
Although the office is endowed with a myriad of smaller responsibilities—as
compared to the City Council or the Mayor’s office—four chief powers of the
Borough President make the position noteworthy. These include: (1) stewardship of
five percent of the city’s capital budget each year to spend on discretionary projects;
(2) the ability to introduce legislation directly to the City Council;68 (3) the power to
make appointments to Community Boards; and (4) a direct line of communication to
the Mayor’s office to make recommendations concerning the borough’s interests.69
Observers of city government refer to the Borough Presidents’ role as “public
advocates” on behalf of their respective boroughs.70 An active Borough President
63. “With results reported from 98 percent of the city’s election districts . . . the proposed revision to the City

Charter had been approved by a ratio of about five to four. Slightly more than 488,000 people voted for
the charter plan, or 55 percent, and about 403,400 voted against the proposal, or 45 percent.” Id.

64. See Sam Roberts, Metro Matters; Borough Chiefs See Their Sliver of Pie Crumbling, N.Y. Times, Apr. 4,

1991, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/04/nyregion/metro-matters-borough-chiefssee-their-sliver-of-pie-crumbling.html; Alan Finder, The Shape of Borough Presidents to Come, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 29, 1989, at 29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/04/29/nyregion/the-shape-of-boroughpresidents-to-come.html; see also Holub & Gonikberg-Dolinskiy, supra note 2, at 1211.

65.

See N.Y.C. Charter §§ 81–86 (2013).

66. Id. § 82.
67.

In 2002, the Borough Presidents also lost the ability to appoint a member to the New York City Board
of Education.

68. N.Y.C. Charter § 82(11) (“[The president of the borough shall] . . . Have power to have legislation

introduced in the council; such proposed legislation shall indicate that it was introduced at the behest of
the borough president.”).

69. See Finder, supra note 2, at 29; see also N.Y.C. Charter § 82(6) (“[The president of a borough shall] . . .

Make recommendations to the mayor and to other city officials in the interests of the people of the
borough.”).

70. Holub & Gonikberg-Dolinskiy, supra note 2, at 1208.

201

A Case for and Against the Borough President

lobbying the Mayor or voicing the interests of the borough to the media creates
positive results for the borough, even if the Mayor fundamentally disagrees with
what was being advocated. Therefore, the Borough President’s status as an advocate
allows for both increased debate and discourse in situations where there is
disagreement and increased awareness when initiatives in one borough begin to
generate negative externalities in another.71 The Borough President’s close proximity
to the people can bring an issue to the forefront of the city’s political discourse by
convening public hearings to discuss matters of public importance.72
In addition to their status as public advocates, the Borough Presidents, despite
the dramatic changes to the position, wield the power of the purse, with some control
over the annual budget. Prior to the dissolution of the Board of Estimate, the Board
shared with the City Council the powers that were used to pass city budgets.73 Now,
the Borough Presidents are given control of five percent of the city’s budget.74 The
Borough Presidents lack the statutory power via the vote in the Board of Estimate to
craft a budget, but they still retain their lobbying power to influence City Council
decisionmaking. The discretionary budget is the most important aspect of the
position today and this makes the Borough Presidency a sought-after post.75
B. Borough Presidents and Community Boards

The Borough Presidents also retain their ability to start and cultivate grassroots
political movements through their relationships with their borough’s Community
Boards. Each Board consists of up to fifty active members of the community selected
by the Borough Presidents.76 Community Boards were originally conceived in the
71.

See Eli Rosenberg, Borough President Markowitz and Mayor Bloomberg at Odds over National Guard
Response for Hurricane Sandy, Brooklyn Paper, Nov. 1, 2012, http://www.brooklynpaper.com/
stories/35/44/all_martysnubbed_2012_11_02_bk.html (“The two politicians, who are both in their
final terms, often appear together at borough events—but this is not the first time they’ve been at odds.
Markowitz slammed Bloomberg’s decision over a taxi manufacturer—[a] move Markowitz said would
cost the borough an 800 job auto plant—in 2011, and the Mayor has vocally disagreed with Markowitz’s
push for casino gambling in Coney Island.”); see also Erin Durkin, Brooklyn Borough President Marty
Markowitz Blasts Mayor Bloomberg over Mex-Built ‘Taxis of Tomorrow’, N.Y. Daily News, May 4, 2011,
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/brooklyn-borough-president-marty-markowitzblasts-mayor-bloomberg-mex-built-taxis-tomorrow-article-1.140115.

72. N.Y.C. Charter § 82(5).
73. Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 627–28.
74.

Holub & Gonikberg-Dolinskiy, supra note 2, at 1204.

75. See Joe Anuta, Candidates Carve Out Concepts on How Best to Be Queens Beep, TimesLedger, Mar. 28,

2013, http://www.timesledger.com/stories/2013/13/debatebeep_all_2013_03_29_q.html (“The most
tangible source of power is capital spending. The borough president receives 5 percent of the city’s
capital budget each year to dole out on whatever projects he or she deems fit.”); Lore Croghan, ‘A
Champion for Brooklyn’: Pols Have Raised Big Bucks for Race to Become Borough President, N.Y. Daily
News, Jan. 14, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/pols-raising-big-bucksbrooklyn-borough-president-race-article-1.1239314.

76.		
Each Community Board is led by a District Manager who establishes an office, hires

staff, and implements procedures to improve the delivery of city services to the district.
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early 1950s by Manhattan Borough President Robert F. Wagner, Jr. as small councils
used to help the Borough President with budgets and planning.77 Presently, there are
a total of fifty-nine Community Boards in New York City.78 Community Boards are
the chief vehicle for citizens to take a proactive role in shaping city politics, and
Borough Presidents facilitate this by encouraging Community Board membership
and voicing the Boards’ concerns to the Mayor or City Council.
Borough Presidents have historically retained close working relationships with
Community Boards. This alliance between Borough Presidents and Community
Boards was an important response to what many considered to be heartless urban
planning efforts crafted by Robert Moses and other wealthy New Yorkers.79 An
example of such an urban planning project was the proposed Manhattan Expressway
project, a highway cutting eastbound through Lower Manhattan, linking the
Holland Tunnel to the Manhattan and Williamsburg Bridges over the East River.80
The proposed construction of the project called for the near-total destruction of
SoHo, an area home to artists’ studios, galleries, small restaurants, and fashion
While the main responsibility of the board office is to receive complaints from
community residents, they also maintain other duties, such as processing permits for
block parties and street fairs. Many boards choose to provide additional services and
manage special projects that cater to specific community needs, including organizing
tenants associations and coordinating neighborhood cleanup programs.

About Community Boards, N.Y.C. Mayor’s Cmty Affairs Unit, http://www.nyc.gov/html/cau/html/
cb/about/about.shtml#govt (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).

All five current Borough Presidents make strong attempts to encourage Community Board membership.
See Get Involved in Your Community Board, Office of Brooklyn Borough President Marty
Markowitz, http://www.brooklyn-usa.org/pages/Community_Board/getinvolved.htm (last visited
Sept. 2, 2013); Community Boards, Office of Queens Borough President Helen M. Marshall,
http://www.queensbp.org/content_web/CB/cb_new.shtml (last visited Sept. 2, 2013); Community Board
Reform and Empowerment, Office of Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer, http://
www.mbpo.org/free_details.asp?id=65 (last visited Sept. 2, 2013); Borough President Urges Residents to
Join Community Boards, Lo-Down, Jan. 3, 2012, http://www.thelodownny.com/leslog/2012/01/
borough-president-urges-residents-to-join-community-boards.html; Staten Island Community Boards,
N.Y.C. Mayor’s Cmty. Affairs Unit, http://www.nyc.gov/html/cau/html/cb/si.shtml (last visited
Sept. 2, 2013); Memorandum from Bronx Borough President Ruben Diaz Jr. to All Community Board
Applicants (2012), available at http://bronxboropres.nyc.gov/communityboards/cb2012memo.pdf
(“Thank you for expressing an interest in becoming a community board member. . . . Community
boards bring government directly to the people and members play a vital role in ensuring that our
neighborhoods receive the services they need to continue to thrive.”).

77.

Biography of Robert Ferdinand Wagner, N.Y.C. 100, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nyc100/html/classroom/
hist_info/mayors.html#wagner (last visited Sept. 2, 2013); see also Seth Forman, Community Boards,
Gotham Gazette, http://www.gothamgazette.com/lessons/boards.shtml (last visited Aug. 23, 2013).

78. About Community Boards, supra note 76. Brooklyn has the largest number of Community Boards with

eighteen, followed by Queens with fourteen, Manhattan and Bronx with twelve, and Staten Island with
three. Id.

79. See, e.g., Weil, supra note 8, at 274–75.
80. The idea for the Lower Manhattan Expressway was put forth in the 1929 Regional Plan of New York and

Its Environs and was approved by Mayor Fiorello La Guardia in 1940. For a scathing critique of Robert
Moses’s urban renovation projects, see Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American
Cities (1961).
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boutiques. The mobilization of these Community Boards, comprised of tenants,
small business owners, and small neighborhood councils, forced the Board of
Estimate to unanimously vote in opposition to the proposed expressway.81
The Boards most heavily invested in city politics were dubbed “little city halls.”82
In the later decades of the twentieth century, alliances between the Borough Presidents
and these Community Boards facilitated urban renewal efforts, specifically those in
Chelsea and Brooklyn Heights.83 Continuing today, Borough Presidents work closely
with Community Boards to properly administer municipal services within the
community’s boundaries.84 Community Boards must be consulted on the placement
of most municipal facilities in the community and on other land use issues.85 Borough
Presidents and Community Boards also form a coalition to help deliver municipal
services to smaller communities within the borough. Community Boards, together
with Borough Presidents, also take an active role in planning and coordinating street
fairs, parades, and other civic gatherings.86 In this respect, Borough Presidents
facilitate events and gatherings that foster borough pride.
V.	OBSOLETE OFFICE OR INTEGRAL ADVOCATE? THE FUTURE OF THE BOROUGH
PRESIDENCY

Even articles describing the importance of the Borough President in current New
York City politics begin with the premise that the position has lost nearly all of its
former power and is facing an uncertain future.87 The current salary of each Borough
President is $160,000. The combined salary of $800,000 for all five Borough
Presidents becomes a rather large target in times of deficits, recessions, and heightened
focus on government spending.88 Although the cost in terms of the Borough Presidents’
salaries is relatively small, a staff in the hundreds is required to support the five
81.

Richard P. Hunt, Expressway Vote Delayed by City; Final Decision is Postponed After 6-Hour Hearing, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 7, 1962, at 32.

82. Weil, supra note 8, at 275.
83. Id.
84. N.Y.C. Mayor’s Cmty. Affairs Unit, supra note 76. The Boards also review applications for changes

in or variances from zoning resolutions, which must come before the Board for review, and the Board’s
position is considered in the final determination. Id.

85. Id.
86. Id.
87.

See Jonathan P. Hicks, 5 Presidents Without (Much) Portfolio; Doubts Are Raised About Largely Ceremonial
Borough Chief Post, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1996, at 29, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/05/12/
nyregion/5-presidents-without-much-portfolio-doubts-are-raised-about-largely-ceremonial.html. (“[A]
growing number of present and former city officials are saying the position should be scaled back or
abolished. Even the borough presidents’ defenders say that the office is most useful as a platform for
people seeking higher office.”); see also Anuta, supra note 75 (“And when the Board of Estimate was
abolished, many questioned whether the position of borough presidents should be retained . . . .”);
Croghan, supra note 75 (“They’re campaigning for cash—to vie for a job many feel is more about ribboncutting than political clout.”).

88. See N.Y.C. Charter § 81(c) (2013).
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offices, adding millions of dollars to the city’s operating expenses.89 Their annual
discretionary budgets lead many commentators to rail against the millions of dollars
in taxpayer money spent on “pet projects.”90
A. Cut From the Squad: Why the Boroughs’ Main Cheerleaders Should Be Let Go

The three main arguments in favor of abolishing the position in its entirety are
that, first, without any real power behind it, the Borough Presidency and its budget
are a waste of taxpayer money; second, the position has become a prime example of
excessive bureaucracy; and finally, because of the strong Mayor and City Council,
the boroughs do not need their own representatives.
In looking at the first argument, it is clear the Great Recession led to greater
scrutiny of where and why the government was spending its capital. Accordingly,
commentators took aim at the Borough Presidency. Particularly during 2009 and
2010, when the recession was at its worst, the Borough Presidency became a veritable
punching bag for columnists attempting to highlight foolhardy government spending.91
For instance, Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz was lambasted for
purchasing a hybrid Toyota Highlander SUV with a touchscreen navigation system.92
As of 2009, Markowitz’s office had a staff of sixty-five and an annual operating
budget of $5.6 million.93 Despite that, there was an outcry in the news media about
the $50,000 used to refurbish his office; even the postage fees the office paid for
mailing newsletters were scrutinized.94 Likewise, Helen Marshall of Queens was the
subject of a scathing inquiry into her stewardship of her discretionary budget.95 As
was the case for Markowitz, Marshall’s purchase of $103,000 worth of office furniture
exposed her to intense criticism.96 No Borough President was immune from the
89. See Hicks, supra note 87.
90. Id.
91.

Tina Moore, Marty Markowitz ‘Reinvented’ Position as Brooklyn Borough President, N.Y. Daily News,
Mar. 15, 2009, at 18, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn/marty-markowitzreinvented-position-brooklyn-borough-president-article-1.371096.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94. Id. (“At the same time, Markowitz spent about $50,000 on office furniture—primarily chairs and

desks—and hundreds of thousands of dollars on postal and printing charges to mail 350,000 newsletters
four times a year.”).

95. Benjamin Lesser, Furniture Fit for a Queens Borough President Helen Marshall, N.Y. Daily News, Mar.

14, 2009, at 5, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/queens/furniture-fit-queensborough-president-helen-marshall-article-1.369635 (“When it comes to spending taxpayer money on
office furniture, nobody touches Queens Borough President Helen Marshall.”).

96. Id. (“Last fiscal year, she dropped $103,000, far more than any of her peers. Most of that—$82,500—

paid for 200 office chairs at about $400 a chair. Four high back ‘guest chairs’ cost $2,936, refurbishing
Marshall’s desk and cabinet cost another $5,000, and custom drapes installed on 12 oversized windows
cost another $4,985. Other decorative charges include $4,994 for picture frames and $2,208 for a
backdrop banner.”).
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intense criticism.97 The focus on every dime spent by a Borough President cultivated
greater debate about the need for the position in the long term.
The position was also criticized as unnecessary. New York State Senator Pedro
Espada—despite having run for Bronx Borough President in 2001—publicly called
for the abolition of the office during a 2010 Charter Review Commission hearing.98
Espada used both the excessive government and fiscal prudence arguments, arguing
that the position must go in order to reduce the budget and that “less government
means more citizen empowerment.” 99 Six months earlier, in a bit of entertaining
political theater, Republican David Casavis ran for Manhattan Borough President
with a campaign promise to abolish the position after his election.100 Casavis echoed
the predominant reasons for abolishing the position: responsibility to the taxpayers
and trimming the size of city government.101 To reinforce his argument about the
superfluous nature of the position, he mentioned the considerable size of the Borough
Presidents’ staffs compared to the staffs of New York State Assemblymen and State
Senators; he then went one step further, comparing Manhattan Borough President
Scott Stringer to the Prince of Wales and Paris Hilton.102
The third major reason for abolishing the position centers on the rise of the City
Council as the predominant legislative body in the wake of the Board of Estimate’s
demise. Once the 1989 Charter revisions were ratified, the Borough Presidents
instantly lost any authority to craft and vote on the city’s budget.103 Losing their seats
at the table with respect to the budget process made the Borough Presidents obsolete.
The Commissioners who developed the 1989 Charter revisions created a highly
centralized City Hall, with great power in the hands of the Mayor and City Council.104
This was in marked contrast to the decentralized power of the Board of Estimate,
with the voting power of the Borough Presidents acting as a way to extend power
away from the Mayor and City Council. The losses suffered by the Borough Presidents
with the demise of the Board were gains for the City Council. As Commissioner
97.

Tina Moore, Erin Einhorn & Benjamin Lesser, Borough Presidents Spend Our Tax Bucks but We Get Little
Back, N.Y. Daily News, Mar. 17, 2009, at 5, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
borough-presidents-spend-tax-bucks-new-yorkers-back-article-1.369625.

98. See Celeste Katz, Espada: Let’s Dump the PA and the Beeps, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 13, 2010, http://

www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/2010/04/espada-lets-dump-the-pa-and-be.html; see also Jose
Martinez, Sen. Espada Signs Up For Beep Race, N.Y. Daily News, July 12, 2001, at 1, available at http://
www.nydailynews.com/archives/boroughs/sen-espada-signs-beep-race-article-1.923655.

99. Katz, supra note 98.
100. James Barron, Win the Job. Then Get Rid of It., N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 2009, http://cityroom.blogs.

nytimes.com/2009/10/23/win-the-job-then-get-rid-of-it/.

101. Id.
102. Id. (“‘What does Prince Charles do?’ Mr. Casavis said. ‘He shows up and cuts a ribbon. That’s what the

borough president does.’ . . . He [Casavis] is also one of the few people who has ever mentioned Paris
Hilton in the same sentence as the words ‘borough president’—as in, she would make a fine one. This
was after he had explained that the borough presidency is a job for B-list types.”).

103. See Hicks, supra note 87, at 29.
104. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 43, at 776.
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Schwarz recalled, “besides the decision to eliminate the Board of Estimate, the
decision to empower and expand the Council was the Commission’s most important
decision.”105 One of the reasons cited for the empowerment of the City Council was
that a stronger legislature would be needed to counterbalance the strength of the
Mayor’s office.106 Furthermore, with the loss of the Board, the Borough President
position was now a fully executive office, with no seat on any legislative body.
Commentators also point out that the loss of budgetary powers was a death blow to
the position.107 Although the City Council became the sole legislative body in New
York City, the 1989 Commission felt that the discretionary budget the Borough
Presidents were given was the trade-off for the loss of their former budgetary powers.108
The rise of the City Council in stature, the heavier scrutiny on discretionary
government spending, and the rally against big government are all placed on the
scales in weighing whether to retain or abolish the position of Borough President.
Working against the Borough Presidents, and in favor of abolishing the office, is the
fact that the position was supplanted by the City Council, and lost all legislative
power with the abolition of the Board of Estimate in the 1989 revisions. Those who
argue that the Borough Presidents’ discretionary budget is a waste of taxpayer money
can point to the fiscal constraints and harsh realities of the present-day economy for
support. Despite those criticisms, proponents of the office raise arguments that the
Borough Presidents are vital to keeping all five boroughs equally vibrant.
B. The Super City’s Special Executives: Keeping the Borough Presidents

When the borough system was created in 1898, it cultivated a dual form of civic
pride: pride in one’s city coupled with pride in one’s borough.109 Borough identities
have been shaped throughout generations by immigration patterns, the service versus
manufacturing dynamic of the city’s economy, and even the bridges and expressways
bisecting and connecting the metropolis.110 In the post–1989 city government, a
byproduct of the Borough Presidents’ lack of de jure political power is the ease and
candor with which they can be outspoken voices in favor of their borough’s interests.111
The heightened visibility of the position to the citizens of each borough makes the
Borough Presidency more than a mere ceremonial position in community governance.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 777.
107. See Hicks, supra note 87, at 29.
108. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 43, at 846–52.
109. See Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 11–32; see also Holub & Gonikberg-Dolinskiy, supra note 2, at

1210.

110. See Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 12, at 11–32.
111. See Dao, supra note 58; see also Maggie Hayes, Borough President Marshall Fights Mayor’s Budget Cuts,

Queens Courier, Feb. 28, 2013, http://queenscourier.com/2013/queens-borough-president-fightsmayors-budget-cuts/; Clarissa Wei, Borough President Stringer Speaks Out Against Proposed Firehouse
Closings, Office of Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.
mbpo.org/blog_details.asp?id=399.
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But those who argue that the position is merely ceremonial forget that visibility to the
citizenry is an integral aspect of community governance, and a community as large and
diverse as New York City is no different. For instance, a New York Times article described
a day in the life of former Brooklyn Borough President Howard Golden in 1996:
Mr. Golden, like his counterparts, keeps a fast-paced schedule. On one
recent day, he shuttled between a meeting of community board leaders at one
end of Borough Hall and a group of Brooklyn assembly members and college
presidents at the other.
Later, his chauffeur drove him to Bushwick, where he swore in new officers
at a center for the elderly, then to Bedford-Stuyvesant to a fund-raising event
for a political ally. On other days, he sends out press releases, cuts ribbons,
officiates at dedications, talks to neighborhood groups and listens to their
complaints. He is greeted at each stop with enthusiasm, sometimes elation.112

The portrayal of Golden’s daily routine shows a man doing what most citizens would
want a community leader to do: traversing the entire borough, meeting with leaders
from schools and various civic groups, and engaging and listening to those who
approach him.113
A peculiar aspect to New York City politics that makes the office of Borough
President increasingly relevant is that the third-most-populated borough, Manhattan,
is the political and economic heart of the city.114 Because of this, the four Borough
Presidents from the outer boroughs are important for counterbalancing a Manhattancentered city government. In what was an ominous sign of things to come, David
Dinkins, the last Manhattan Borough President to wield power through the Board
of Estimate and the only Borough President not to openly criticize the 1989
proposals, went on to be elected Mayor on the same night that the Schwarz
Commission’s Charter proposals were ratified by the electorate.115 Just as the 1898
Charter revisions and New York City’s consolidation decentralized the city’s
government by creating separate counties within Greater New York City, the 1989
revisions brought power back to City Hall and away from the boroughs. Since that
time, the outer boroughs, while representing nearly three-fourths of the voting power
112. Hicks, supra note 87, at 29.
113. Today, Borough Presidents Stringer and Diaz heavily utilize Facebook to communicate with

constituents. Borough Presidents Stringer, Markowitz, and Diaz all use Twitter each day to engage with
the public and foster borough pride. See https://twitter.com/scottmstringer; https://twitter.com/
rubendiazjr; https://twitter.com/MartyMarkowitz.

114. As of the 2010 census, the population in each borough was as follows: Brooklyn: 2,504,700; Queens:

2,230,722; Manhattan: 1,585,873; Bronx: 1,385,108; and Staten Island: 468,730. According to Census
Bureau population estimates, New York City’s population increased from 8,175,133 in April 2010 to
8,336,697 in July 2012. This is an increase of 161,564 residents or about two percent over the 2010
mark. The largest percentage change in the city’s population occurred in Brooklyn, which grew by 2.4%
or 60,900 persons, followed by Manhattan (2.1% or 33,200 persons), Queens (1.9% or 42,000 persons),
and the Bronx (1.7% or 23,400 persons). Staten Island (0.4% or 2000 persons) showed the smallest gains
over the twenty-seven-month period. See Current Population Estimates for July 2012, N.Y.C. Dep’t of
City Planning, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/census/popcur.shtml (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).

115. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 43, at 729.

208

N

VOLUME 58 | 2013/14

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

in the city, sometimes feel like second-class entities under the Manhattan-centered
city government.116 The Borough Presidents’ independence from the Mayor and City
Hall serves to protect the interests of the outlying boroughs, making the Borough
President an indispensable position.
Borough Presidents are cognizant of a perceived Manhattan-dominated government
and offer rebuttals to the calls for abolishing the position itself.117 Former Queens
Borough President Claire Shulman offered these sentiments in response to those
questioning the need for the position: “[i]f those people decide that borough presidents
should be eliminated, let me tell you what will happen, the four boroughs outside of
Manhattan will become beggars, and most of the important resources of the city will go
to Manhattan.”118 Shulman opined that, with a combination of political acumen and
fierce advocacy, she accomplished real change for Queens. Among her accomplishments
were new cultural institutions at Flushing Meadows Corona Park, a sewer system installed
in southeast Queens, and the construction of Queens Hospital Center in Jamaica.119
Critics of the Borough Presidency also fail to offer feasible alternatives that
promote the interests of each borough and foster political accountability to constituents.
For example, in lieu of the Borough Presidency, commissions could be formed or
special executives appointed, each responsible for handling the day-to-day intraborough affairs. Staten Island Borough President Molinaro warned that because the
city is so large, the Mayor would have to appoint a person to run the day-to-day
municipal services for each borough anyway. Proponents of the Borough Presidency
opine that a commission or special executive in charge of each borough would be
beholden to the Mayor’s office.120 Having an elected representative fosters greater
accountability and furthers the borough’s interests greater than an “unelected aid to
the mayor” would.121 Molinaro pointed out that each outer borough has a greater
population than most notable small cities in the United States.122 That being the case,
it is simply not feasible to govern a vast city of over eight million residents with a
Mayor and City Council situated in one central borough.
116. See N.Y.C. Bd. of Elections, Statement and Return Report for Certification: General

Election 2009 (2009), available at http://vote.nyc.ny.us/downloads/pdf/results/2009/General/
1.11CitywideMayorRecap.pdf; see also Bruce N. Gyory, Battle for Mayor Will Come Down to Outer
Boroughs, City & State, Dec. 4, 2012, http://www.cityandstateny.com/battle-for-mayor-will-comedown-to-outer-boroughs/ (“Manhattan dominates Gotham’s finance and media industries—and hence
the culture of New York—but the outer boroughs hold the vast majority of voters (in 2010 casting 69
percent of the Democratic primary vote and 74 percent of the general election vote).”).

117. Anuta, supra note 75.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Editorial, Why Staten Island Needs a BP: Each Borough Should Have Its Own ‘Mayor’, Staten Island

Advance, Mar. 3, 2013, http://www.silive.com/opinion/editorials/index.ssf/2013/03/why_we_need_a_
bp_each_borough.html.

121. Id.
122. With over 400,000 residents, Staten Island, the least populated borough, still has a larger population

than Atlanta, Cleveland, Miami, and Minneapolis. Each of those cities has its own Mayor. Id.
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As many have pointed out, the power wielded by the City Council to shape
citywide policy supplants much of the power of the Borough Presidency, to the point
where calls for the abolition of the position have gained traction. But the City
Council’s clout can fluctuate depending upon who is in the Mayor’s office, while the
Borough Presidents can consistently use their influence to speak out for or against
certain policies. Moreover, the Borough President, as an executive with control over a
budget, can respond more quickly as issues arise. Given the problems facing the city,
such as gun violence, education, and post–Hurricane Sandy recovery, a determined
Borough President could still accomplish great things. For instance, as the Bronx
suffered in the wake of aging public housing and affordable care, Borough President
Diaz directed over $20 million of the office’s capital budget into projects to revitalize
the Bronx.123 Twenty-four percent of the discretionary budget went toward housing
developments, including 110 units of mixed-use housing, as well as a solar thermal
project to create green energy for existing buildings.124 Because there is always a
demand for housing in New York City, urgency in crafting remedial measures might
have been lacking but for the work of Borough President Diaz’s office.
Over in Manhattan, Borough President Stringer’s office continually produces
comprehensive reports on future economic development in the borough. A report
entitled Start-Up City was published in December of 2012 with the goal of fostering
entrepreneurialism in Manhattan; the report detailed suggested reforms and ways to
encourage start-up businesses in the twenty-first-century economy.125 Stringer’s report
identified certain aspects of the city’s building code that were hindering construction
and development of office space, including space that could potentially accommodate
small entrepreneurs.126 Stringer’s work on this and other topics raised awareness of
areas of city government in need of reform. In this respect, the work done by the
Borough President can act as a precursor to later legislative initiatives.
These examples show how a driven Borough President can actively assist in
addressing a borough’s social and economic ills. The proximity of the office to the
population, the foresight concerning many issues that accompanies that proximity,
and the office’s ability to respond more quickly than a legislative body counterbalances
its lack of formal political power in the post–Board of Estimate city government.
C. The 2013 Elections and a New Wave of Borough Presidents

The year 2013, the twenty-fourth anniversary of voters’ approval of the 1989
Charter revisions, may be remembered as a year of transition. On Election Day 2013,
123. Press Release, Bronx Borough President Rubin Diaz, Jr., Borough President Diaz Provides Nearly $23

Million in Funding for Bronx Organizations, available at http://bronxboropres.nyc.gov/press/
releases/2012-07-09.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).

124. Id.
125. Office of Manhattan Borough President Scott Stringer, Start-up City: Growing New

York’s Entrepreneurial Ecosystem for All (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.mbpo.org/
uploads/StartupCity.pdf.

126. Id. at 14–16.
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the people of New York will elect at least four new Borough Presidents. Marty
Markowitz, Helen Marshall, and Guy Molinaro have reached their term limits,
while Scott Stringer is seeking the citywide office of Comptroller.127 Opportunity
abounds to reinvigorate the position. For instance, since the 1989 revisions, only Guy
Molinari and James Molinaro have held the Borough Presidency in Staten Island.128
Likewise, only Claire Shulman and Helen Marshall have presided over Queens, and
only Howard Golden and Marty Markowitz have held the office in Brooklyn.129 If
the spending errors of past Borough Presidents can serve as guidance, the new
candidates coming to the forefront in the next election cycle are now armed with
greater understanding of what it takes to thrive in this present political climate.130
The 2013 races for the Borough Presidencies have taken shape and the candidates
are determined to learn how to maximize their effectiveness with the office’s limited
powers. Evidence of this is exhibited in the races for Brooklyn and Queens Borough
President.131 According to State Senator and candidate for Brooklyn Borough
President Eric Adams, “People misunderstand and think the borough president has
lost the ability to lead.”132 Adams says he has thoroughly studied the City Charter in
order to better understand the extent of the office’s powers,133 and has vowed to use
those powers to introduce legislation directly to the City Council, in accordance with
section 82 of the Charter.134 Even more telling was his statement that “I have no
desire to spend the next four years cutting ribbons only.”135 Adams said he will
immediately get involved with a fresh crop of Community Board members and tackle
some of Brooklyn’s most daunting problems by ordering studies and holding hearings
on gun violence,136 obesity, and health care.137
127. David W. Chen, Candidates Are Lining Up For Top Posts on ’13 Ballot, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 2012, at

A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/nyregion/races-for-top-offices-on-new-yorksballot-in-2013-take-shape.html?_r=0.

128. See Office of the Staten Island Borough President, http://statenislandusa.com (last visited Sept.

2, 2013).

129. See Office of Brooklyn Borough President Marty Markowitz, http://www.brooklyn-usa.org

(last visited Sept. 2, 2013); Office of Queens Borough President Helen M. Marshall, http://
www.queensbp.org (last visited Sept. 2, 2013).

130. See Croghan, supra note 75; Anuta, supra note 75.
131. See Croghan, supra note 75; Anuta, supra note 75.
132. Croghan, supra note 75.
133. Id.
134. Id.; see also N.Y.C. Charter § 82(11) (2013).
135. Crogan, supra note 75.
136. Candidate Adams has placed gun control and police-to-citizen interaction at the forefront of his

campaign—fitting since Brooklyn was the deadliest borough in terms of total murders. Croghan, supra
note 75; see also Joe Kemp, Brooklyn Leads City in Total Murders, N.Y. Daily News, May 18, 2012,
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/brooklyn-leads-city-total-murders-article-1.1080962.

137. See Anuta, supra note 75.
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VI.	KEEP THE “BEEP”: FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE BOROUGHS’ NEED FOR AN
EXECUTIVE AND SPOKESPERSON

Since the consolidation and creation of Greater New York City in 1898, New
York City politics can be characterized as a pendulum swinging between centralization
and decentralization, between City Hall and the outer boroughs. Because of the
strong Mayor and City Council in city politics today, the position of Borough
President ought to be retained to facilitate progress at the local level and protect the
outer boroughs. Those in favor of abolishing the position have failed to articulate
ways to provide for the outer boroughs and avoid a Manhattan-based focus on city
politics. Because each borough faces its own unique issues, Borough Presidents can
use their discretionary budget and collaborative efforts with Community Boards and
concerned citizens to respond faster than a traditional legislative body.
The myriad candidates vying for the office represent a brighter future for the
position. Although the office’s power is diminished when compared to the days of
the Board of Estimate, Borough Presidents today have a more comprehensive
knowledge of their own powers and limitations. As Dick Dadey, Executive Director
of Citizens Union, has remarked, the position’s power depends on the personality of
who is in office.138 Moreover, the vigor with which candidates discuss their plans for
the future of the boroughs points to the continued validity of the position as well.
The fact that candidates are leaving positions such as City Council Member or State
Senator—legislative positions traditionally holding more political clout—indicates
that the Borough Presidency is more appealing than critics acknowledge.139 The
position is a stepping stone to more prestigious citywide government positions, such
as Comptroller or Mayor, and it is a unique proving ground. The competition for the
office draws candidates eager to show themselves as diligent stewards over budgets
and capable facilitators of grassroots legislative change in areas of social need.
The five boroughs combine to create the most populated city in the United States.140
Abolishing a position designed to advance the interests of the individual boroughs
within the city would be a mistake. No doubt the position is at a crossroads, but now
that the office’s powers have been clarified following the 1989 Charter revisions, a new
wave of Borough Presidents can facilitate positive changes in city government. The
office allows the Borough President to go against the grain when he or she fears
citywide policies are generating negative effects in one particular borough. Moreover,
the city’s diverse population does not always share a unified vision. For these reasons,
the office is an often overlooked and indispensable part of New York City government.
138. Id.
139. See Croghan, supra note 75. Both State Senator Eric Adams and City Councilman Domenic Recchia

have raised over $100,000 toward their respective campaigns for Brooklyn Borough President. Anuta,
supra note 75. State Senator Tony Avella (D-Bayside), City Councilman Leroy Comrie (D-St. Albans),
Director of Community Boards Barry Grodenchik, former State Assemblywoman Melinda Katz, State
Senator Jose Peralta, and Councilman Peter Vallone Jr. are all vying to replace Queens Borough
President Helen Marshall in the November 2013 election.

140. The Most Populated Cities in the United States, Nationsonline.org, http://www.nationsonline.org/

oneworld/most_pop_cities_usa.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2013).
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